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Abstract
A model for the credit risk of a portfolio of market driven nancial contracts (for
example swaps) is introduced. The viewpoint of the nancial institution who holds
this portfolio is taken. The default intensity of a single counterparty is assumed to
write as a sum of two parts: An individual component is unknown and modelled
as noise, the collective component is known and dependent on market variables
(like the interest rate). The inuence of the credit events to the market variables
is neglected. The advantage of this model is given by the possibility to consider
the statistic of the credit events conditioned on a market situation. By taking a
functional like the expectation value of this conditional statistic only the market
variables remain stochastic. Therefore this model is especially suited for measuring
the impact of the market variables onto the credit risk.
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0 Introduction
In the last year severe crises in the worldwide nancial markets shook the condence in the
management of market and especially credit risk. One of the most prominent examples
was given by the LTCM Hedge Fund which got into deep nancial struggle because of a
misspecication of the models for the credit spreads. This became dangerous in the case
of Russian bonds: The quasi-default of the Russian bond issuers lead to the total failure
of these models and with this of the risk management of LTCM. In this case it became
obvious that the success of risk management is very dependent of the modelling of the
risks involved.
In this light even the credit risk of a portfolio of simple bonds appears dicult to handle
(We take always the view of the nancial institution which holds this portfolio). How
to put together the values of the outstanding contracts (i.e. the exposure) which are
held by the dierent counterparties? How to bring in the dierent default probabilities
of the single counterparties? How to take the correlation between default events into
consideration? There is no standardized approach to this problem.
With CreditMetrics and CreditRisk+ (see J.P.Morgan (1997) and CreditSuisse (1997))
two theoretical frameworks are presented, which address this problem. While CreditRisk+
is an analytically solvable actuarial approach, CreditMetrics relies on Monte Carlo simu-
lation techniques to estimate the possible losses due to default events. As seen by prac-
tioners, both of these models are not easy to implement. For instance a lot of data about
correlations between default events of several counterparties is needed to calibrate the
so-called \rm-value" approach of CreditMetrics. The assumptions in the CreditRisk+
framework are also not easy to justify from the practical point of view.
The situation is even more dicult if one deals not only with simple contracts like bonds
but also with instruments like derivatives whose values depend highly on market variables.
Not only the \pure" credit risk of such contracts has to be regarded but also the behaviour
of the value of these contracts under changes of these market variables. For example, a
swap will have a positive or a negative value in dependency of the changes of the interest
rate. The default of the counterparty in the swap contract might therefore lead to no loss
or a severe loss depending on the actual value of the interest rate. Neither CreditMetrics
nor CreditRisk+ do incorporate these market variables in a natural way. Both of them
might be extended to capture market variables, but would lose their analytical tractability
or numerical elegance. It is still usual to apply \rules of thumb" in regard to the credit
risk of market-driven instruments.
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Usually credit risk management models these two \kinds" of risks as independent stochas-
tic variables: Market variables do not inuence the credit risk and vice-versa. This
\independence assumption" simplies the analysis of the credit risk of market-driven in-
struments, because one can treat the dierent risks separately. This subdivision into
\market" and \credit risks" is deeply embodied in the thinking about risk management.
This is reected in the organization of nancial institution where mostly one section cares
about the credit risk, and another section about the market risk.
But are there really two dierent kinds of risk? A change of the market situation might
also change the nancial standing of some counterparties and with this the credit risk of
these counterparties. In Duee (1996a) the independence assumption is discussed with
examples of market-driven contracts like swaps. In such contracts which are driven by the
change of a market variable and which are subject to credit risk the distinction between
market and credit risks becomes uncertain.
As Duee (1996a) states the independence assumption is dicult to justify even in \nor-
mal" market situations. But in extraordinary market situations this assumption is dan-
gerous because the probability that the credit risk of the counterparties changes with the
market is very high. And these are the situations risk management should account for. In
such extreme situations the failure of the independence assumption is unavoidable. For
instance, due to extraordinary changes of the interest rate nancial institutions might get
into diculties and the credit risk of these institution will increase dramatically.
However the consideration of dependent credit and market risks is very dicult: In ad-
dition to the modelling of the credit risk for each counterparty one has to model also
the correlation with the market variables. There are several dierent possibilities to do
this: One could model the value of the assets of the counterparties. This \rm-value"
should be dependent of the market variables. Or one models the default intensity as
variable with the changes of the market situation. But the defaults could also change the
market variables which further complicates the modelling. In realistic cases usually by
introducing some kind of correlation the analytical tractability is lost.
But even numerically there are diculties to take account of the correlation between
default und market risks. Given a large portfolio of maybe 10000 counterparties, it is
complicated enough to simulate such a great number of counterparties which might default
or not, even if the default probabilities are xed, see Due and Singleton (1998). If these
default probabilities depend on other factors which have to be simulated too, some of the
elegant treatments of the simulation of default times are no more applicable. And the
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requirements for computing power and time are very large in a \brute force" Monte Carlo
simulation approach. If the simulation of the credit risk of a large portfolio has also to be
considered over a long time interval, these requierements grow further which the number
of time steps involved.
And, at last, even if these models are implemented numerically, it is necessary to estimate
the parameters of these models. Proxies for default probabilities might be given by the
ratings (for instance of Moody's or Standards & Poor). But there is a lack of reliable
data about how these default probabilities are eected due to the correlations to market
variables. So the calibration of the models parameters in regard to the interaction between
market and credit risks is dicult too.
In this paper a simplied approach is proposed to handle some of the problems mentioned
above. The most important feature of this model is the modeling of the credit risk (i.e.
the default probability) of a single counterparty as the sum of two components: One
component describes the individual contribution of the considered counterparty to its
credit risk. This idiosyncratic risk is not inuenced by movements in market variables.
In opposite to this the other component describes the change in the default probability
due to changes in the market variables, like the interest rate. This component is therefore
called the collective or systematic contribution to the credit risk.
Given an initial rating for one counterparty this approach allows to adjust the default
probability to a changed market situation by the systematic compenent. The \ocial"
rating by some rating agency is mostly too \sticky", which means that the rating is
adjusted too late, cp. Dullmann et al. (1998). The systematic component gives an
instantaneous re-adjusted default probability, which is in agreement with empirical results,
cp. Fons (1994).
The crucial point of this model is that the idiosyncratic component is assumed to be
unknown to the considered nancial institution. It is therefore modeled as \noise". This
noise prevents from calculating an eect of a change of the credit risk on the market vari-
ables by considering the mathematically reversed relationship. With this the \causality"
of this model is determined: The market risks inuence the credit risks, but not vice-versa.
This model of a \one-sided" dependency between market and credit risks takes a position
between models with \full" dependency (which are far more dicult to handle) and
models which incorporate the assumption of the independence. The simplication due to
this one-sided dependency is the possibilty of considering the credit events conditioned
on a xed market situation. With the market variables xed, only the stochasticity of
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the individual risks remains
1
. In this situation one can take the conditioned expectation
value (or another functional as the upper percentile) of the individual risks to obtain the
expected loss of a portfolio due to defaults given a market situation
2
. By varying this
market situation one can use the model for measuring the impact of this movements in
market variables onto the credit risk: Only a simulation of the market variables has to be
performed to determine the conditioned expected loss due to credit events, no simulation
of the default processes is required.
In this model the inuence of the credit events on the market is neglected. This may be
a severe neglection if for example due to the default of a larger amount of counterparties
the spread on bonds widens in the whole market as it was the case in the Russian crises
mentioned at the beginning of this paper. But this will primarily eect bond prices,
the eects on prices of market-driven instruments as swaps for example might be much
smaller.
This model is suited for dierent applications. The determination of the risk-based capital
is maybe the most important one and discussed in detail with several simulation studies
in Barth (1999). Another application would be the calculation of spreads for dierent
sorts of contracts. The emphasis should lay on the tracking of the market variables.
In the rst chapter the model is presented and discussed. One of the most important
features is the modelling of the default risk. A \response function" of the credit risk due
to the changes in the market risks is introduced. The modelling of this response function
and its calibration with empirical data is discussed in the second chapter.
1 The Loss Process
1.1 Denition
We consider a xed number of N counterparties a = 1; : : : ; N in the time interval [0; T ].
The netted value of the contracts which are traded with counterparty a is denoted by V
a
.
We assume netting of all the contracts with one counterparty, but netting is not applied
between dierent counterparties. We call V
+
a
(t) the exposure to counterparty a at time
1
An investigation of a similar situation in a micro-economic context is given in Berninghaus (1977).
2
If there is a large number of individual risk, an application of the Law of Large Numbers might appear
as appropriate to eliminate the indiviual risks instead of taking the expectation value. This will be
reported in a later version of this paper.
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t 2 [0; T ], where ()
+
= max(0; ). It should not be possible that the considered nancial
institution achieves a gain through the default of a counterparty. The consideration of
the exposure alone might be suited for the setting of risk limits, but not for a quantitative
analysis of the credit risk of a portfolio.
The event of a default of one counterparty a is modelled as each jump of a Poisson process
N
a
with stochastic intensity 
a
. The stochastic intensity 
a
is specied in the next section.
Here we take 
a
as given and concentrate on the modelling of the default events and the
associated losses.
We introduce the default indicator process dN
a
as
dN
a
(t) = lim
t!0
(N
a
(t),N
a
(t,t)) : (1)
Let f
a;i
g
i=1;:::;M
a
be the set of jump times of the Poisson process N
a
in the time interval
[0; T ], where M
a
is the number of the jump times of counterparty a in [0; T ]. Then dN
a
can be rewritten as
dN
a
(t) = lim
t!0
1
f
a;i
2[t t;t)g
(2)
for one i = 1; : : : ;M
a
.
With the modelling of the default event as each jump of N
a
it follows that counterparty
a might default more than one time in [0; T ], i.e. M
a
> 1. This approximation is
usually done in many applications in risk management and is known as the \Poisson
approximation", cf. for example CreditSuisse (1997). The probability for M
a
> 1 is in
quadratic order of the total default probility of counterparty a in [0; T ] and therefore very
small for realistic parameters in credit-risk management. Without this approximation the
default time has to be regarded as a rst-passage time of N
a
, which is analytically dicult
to handle.
With these remarks
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the discounted credit loss dL(t) in the time interval [t, dt; t) writes
as (cp. for a similar approach Albrecht et al. (1996)):
dL(t) =
1
B(0; t)
N
X
a=1
V
+
a
(t)dN
a
(t); (3)
where B(t
1
; t
2
) is the money market account, i.e.
B(t
1
; t
2
) = exp

Z
t
2
t
1
r(s)ds

; (4)
3
We only consider the total loss of the value of the exposure in the default case. The model might be
easily extended to incorporate loss fractions smaller than 1.
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with r(t) as the riskless interest rate at time t 2 [0; T ]. The loss in the whole time interval
[0; T ] is obtained by
L(t) =
Z
t
0
dL; (5)
where the integral is dened for each realisation of dN
a
(a reference for such random
measures can be found in Daley and Vere-Jones (1988)). L(t) can be rewritten as
L(t) =
N
X
a=1
M
a
X
i=1
1
B(0; 
a;i
)
V
+
a
(
a;i
); (6)
where the characteristic function eq.(2) is used with the jump times f
a;i
g
i=1;:::;M
a
.
With dt innitesimal the expectation value of dN
a
can be written as
E [dN
a
(t)] = Prob fdN
a
(t) = 1g
= Prob f
a
2 [t, dt; t)g
= Prob fN
a
(t) = 1jN
a
(t, dt) = 0g
= 
a
(t)dt: (7)
The expression 
a
(t)dt gives the probability that the default event takes place in the time
interval [t, dt; t).
Another modelling approach would be to consider the (unconditioned) Poisson process
N
a
(t) instead of dN
a
(t) in eq.(3). We do not consider this possiblity in this paper, because
in regard to the exposure V
a
at time t the probability of default in a small time interval
prior to t is important, not the probability of default in [0; t].
1.2 Modelling the Risks
In most of the models which deal with the credit risk of market-driven contracts the
default process and the market risk process are assumed to be independent. But this
assumption is dicult to justify, cf. Duee (1996a), Hull (1989). However it is dicult to
overcome this assumption, because there is only little information and data for estimating
a correlation between market and credit risks. In this section we describe one possibility
for incorporating this correlation. Here we describe only the theoretical model, for matters
of calibration and estimation of this model we refer to chapter 2.
We model a \one-sided dependency": The market variables should be \independent" of
the credit risks, but the credit risks could be inuenced by the market variables. For
7
example, a rise in the interest rate might worsen the credit qualtity of many rms, but a
single \downgrading" does not inuence the interest rate
4
.
To do this, we distinguish two \sorts" of risks: First there are \systematic risks" like
market variables, which are known to everybody. In chapter 2 we regard only the interest
rate r as a systematic risk, here r can be a vector of market variables which are assumed
to be important in the application of the model. Second there are \individual risks",
which are not common knowledge: In the following we regard as the individual risk of
counterparty a the nancial state, which is not known exactly to the considered nancial
institution. We model this uncertainty about this nancial state at time t as a random
variable 
a
(t) with a known distribution, see below.
Further we model the credit risks as a function of the market risk r and the residual
individual component 
a
. Here we consider as the credit risk of counterparty a the intensity

a
of the default process I
a
, which we assume has the following form:

a
(t) = S
a
(r(t); t) + 
a
(t); (8)
with a well-behaved function S
a
: R
+
 R ! [l
a
;1), which remains to be modelled,
see chapter 2. S
a
(r(t); t) is the known default intensity of counterparty a in the market
situation r(t). We will refer to S
a
as the \response function", because it describes the
changes in the credit risks due to changes in the market variables r. The constant l
a
> 0
gives a lower bound for this intensity. It is one of the fundamental assumptions in this
paper that this function is only dependent on the actual value of r, not on the path of r up
to this time. The residual 
a
: R
+
! [,l
a
;+l
a
] models the dierence of the \true" default
intensity 
a
and the ocial rating S
a
(r(t); t), which is given for instance by Moody's. S
a
describes the spread in the interest rate due to the known default risk of counterparty a
against a riskless interest rate. This point will be getting more clear in the next section.
We model the individual risk 
a
as diusion process without any drift. With this assump-
tion the doubly stochastic process N
a
based on eq.(8) is well-dened, cf. Grandell (1976).
One important condition is the independence of 
a
of the market-parameter processes r.
Moreover the individual risk processes f
a
g
a=1;:::;N
should be pairwise independent for all
a 6= a
0
.
4
There will be dierent opinions if this approximation works very well in the case of a worst case
scenario (which will be studied in fact), because in worst case scenarios there might be inuences of
the defaults on the level of the interest rate. But we think, that this approximation works better
than the \traditional" independence assumption between market und default risks. Even numerically
a model which incorporate the \full" dependency will be much more computing-intensiv.
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Further we assume, that the drift and the volatility function of the diusion process 
a
is
\common knowledge", i.e. the marginal distributions of 
a
(t) for all t 2 [0; T ] are known
to the considered nancial institution. We state several conditions on these distributions:
The assumption, that the processes of the 
a
are without drift results in E[
a
(t)] = 0 for
all a and t. Without this assumption there would be an expected dierence between the
known spread S
a
and the default intensity 
a
at some time t 2 [0; T ]. Such an expected
dierence would be incorporated to the spread S
a
by the rating agency. Besides it should
be excluded that 
a
< 0: Therefore we restrict 
a
to the interval [,l
a
; l
a
] by cutting o
values which are outside of the interval
5
.
1.3 Treatment of the Exposure Process
The application of a straightforward pricing model for calculating the exposure V
a
neglects
the fundamental information asymmetry, which is responsible for the modelling of the
default process as a Poisson process, cf. Duee (1996a). Therefore the pricing models
have to be modied for the use in a \world with default". One approach is given by
the work of Due and Singleton (1995): The riskless interest rate r is replaced by a
modied interest rate
6
R
a
(t) = r(t) + 
Q
a
(t) under the equivalent martingale measure Q.
The spread 
Q
a
is given by the default intensity under the equivalent martingale measure
Q of the considered counterparty. Then the exposure writes as
7
:
V
a
(t) = E
Q
"
exp
 
,
Z
T
t
R
a
(s)ds
!
Z(r(T ))jF
t
#
: (11)
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We try to keep the notation simple. To be strict, one has to write instead of eq.(8)

a
(t) = S
a
(r(t); t) +C
a
(
a
(t)); (9)
with a cut-o function
C
a
: R! [ l
a
; l
a
]; 
a
(t) 7!
8
>
<
>
:
l
a
if 
a
(t) > l
a
;

a
(t) if 
a
(t) 2 [ l
a
; l
a
];
 l
a
if 
a
(t) <  l
a
:
(10)
Because of its symmetry this function C
a
does not aect the property E[C
a
(
a
(t))] = 0, if the marginal
distributions of the process 
a
are symmetric themselves.
6
If a loss rate L
a
(t) < 1 is considered, one has to write for the modied interest rate R
a
(t) = r(t) +
L
a
(t)
Q
a
(t).
7
This formula is valid only if there is one contract with counterparty a which pays Z(r(T )) at time T ,
otherwise it must be summed over the dierent contracts und times of payos.
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Using eq.(8) and separating the expectation value because of the independence of r and

a
:
V
a
(t) = E
Q
"
exp
 
,
Z
T
t

r(s) + S
Q
a
(r(s); s)

ds
!
Z(r(T ))jF
t
#

E
Q
"
exp
 
,
Z
T
t

Q
a
(s)ds
!
jF
t
#
: (12)
The ltration F describes the development of the information of the considered nancial
institution.
With the expression
E
Q
"
exp
 
,
Z
T
t

Q
a
(s)ds
!
jF
t
#
(13)
the stochastic part of the individual risks is eliminated from the pricing formula. Expres-
sion eq.(13) could be evaluated because the distribution of the  and the transformation
of the real measure to the equivalent martingale measure Q is known
8
. By dening
f
Q
a
(t; T ) = , lnE
Q
"
exp
 
,
Z
T
t

Q
a
(s)ds
!
jF
t
#
(14)
one could write
9
E
Q
"
exp
 
,
Z
T
t

Q
a
(s)ds
!
jF
t
#
= exp

,f
Q
a
(t; T )

: (16)
By inserting eq.(16) into eq.(12)
V
a
(t) = exp

,f
Q
a
(t; T )

E
Q
"
exp
 
,
Z
T
t

r(s) + S
Q
a
(r(s); s)

ds
!
X
T
jF
t
#
; (17)
the term f
Q
a
(t; T ) is identied as an additional contribution to the spread S
Q
, which can
be interpreted as a premium, which has to be payed because of the uncertainty about the
individual risk of the counterparty a in the time interval t 2 [0; T ].
8
The switching between the intensity under the real measure S
a
and the intensity under the equiva-
lent martingale measure S
Q
a
can be done by the Girsanov transformation for Poisson processes, but
empirically established connections exists too, cf. Fons (1994).
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It is maybe convenient to approximate eq.(16) with a zero-order approximation (so that f
Q
a
has not
to take into account), but this is not necessary here:
E
Q
"
exp
 
 
Z
T
t

Q
a
(s)ds
!
jF
t
#
 1: (15)
This approximation is equivalent to the neglection of the inuence of the individual risks 
a
to the
pricing of the contract.
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The most important point of this calculation is that the stochasticity of the individual
default risks does not inuence directly the pricing of the contracts, which makes sense
from the economic point of view, because only the known quantities S
a
and f
a
should
enter into the valuation formula. In a practical implementation one would use instead
empirically determined spreads which also account for other determinants as liquidity and
sector eects not included in this theoretical approach.
1.4 Treatment of the Default Process
dN
a
describes the indicator of a jump of a Poisson process N
a
with a stochastic intensity

a
(t) = S
a
(r(t); t)+ 
a
(t), i.e. a doubly stochastic process or Cox process. This process is
dicult to handle both analytically and numerically. But this process is responsible for
the \weights" of the dierent exposures of the counterparties in regard to the credit risk
of the entire portfolio. Therefore it is necessary to obtain an expression which is easier to
handle.
In the approach of CreditMetrics the market risk is taken into account by regarding only
the average exposure or the maximum exposure. The random variable V
+
a
(r(t); t) is re-
placed by an expected value (as the average) or an upper percentile (as the maximum)
over the time interval t 2 [0; T ]. This eliminates the dependency of the market stochas-
ticity which is given by r. Then this average or maximum exposure is regarded as a xed
quantity and treated like the nominal value of a bond.
In contrast to the approach of CreditMetrics we concentrate on the eects of the market
variables on the credit risks by using the response function S
a
(r) in eq.(8). We take an
expectation value of the credit risks instead of the market risks. This expectation value
is conditioned on the market risk situation which is in this context given by the interest
rate r. This approach is the opposite to the approach of CreditMetrics with respect to the
treatment of the credit and market risks: The individual components of the credit risk

a
are eliminated by taking the expectation value, while only the market-driven collective
component S
a
(r) of the credit risk remains.
By taking the expectation value of eq.(3), conditioned on a xed market scenario r
E [dL(t)jr(t)] = E
"
N
X
a=1
V
+
a
(t)dN
a
(t)jr(t)
#
(18)
and by calculating (for ease of notation we suppress the dependency of r)
E
h
V
+
a
(t)dN
a
(t)jr(t)
i
11
= V
+
a
(t)E [dN
a
(t)jr(t)]
= V
+
a
(t)E [E [dN
a
(t)j
a
(t)] jr(t)]
= V
+
a
(t)E [
a
(t)dtjr(t)]
= V
+
a
(t) [S
a
(r(t); t)dt+ E [
a
(t)]]
= V
+
a
(t)S
a
(r(t); t)dt; (19)
the default process is eliminated. Only the market risk process remains as a source of
uncertainty.
If one is interested in analyzing the impact of the market variables on the credit risk, one
might consider the conditional expectation value of the loss process, which writes as
E [dL(t)jr(t)] =
N
X
a=1
V
+
a
(t)S
a
(r(t); t)dt (20)
instead of examining the loss process eq.(3) itself. The \weights" S
a
(r(t); t)dt represent
the known probability of default in the time interval [t, dt; t). This expression is much
easier to handle in comparison to eq.(3), because only the stochasticity of r remains to
be considered (analytically or numerically).
In addition to the expectation value the variance can be considered. The conditional
variance of the default process of the single counterparty a is calculated as
Var
h
V
+
a
(t)dN
a
(t)jr(t)
i
= (V
+
a
(t))
2
h
S
a
(r)dt, S
a
(r)
2
dt
2
i
= (V
+
a
(t))
2
[S
a
(r)dt] : (21)
The conditional variance of the total portfolio writes as the sum of the single variances,
because the default processes I
a
are independent for a = 1; : : : ; N conditioned on a market
scenario r(t):
Var
"
N
X
a=1
V
+
a
(t)dN
a
(t)jr(t)
#
=
N
X
a=1
(V
+
a
(t))
2
h
S
a
(r)dt, S
a
(r)
2
dt
2
i
=
N
X
a=1
(V
+
a
(t))
2
[S
a
(r)dt] : (22)
It depends of the kind of application of this model in which sense the variance has to be
regarded. Again the important point is the elimination of the individual default charac-
teristic 
a
.
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In the case of a large portfolio one might think about the Law of Large Numbers to
eliminate the individual default stochastics. This will lead to the same result eq.(20),
but the interpretation would be a stronger one: Instead of seeing eq.(20) as the expected
loss conditioned in a given market scenario, eq.(20) would be the real loss in this market
situation. No variance has to be regarded. Compare also to the application of the Law of
Large Numbers in the \large economy" in Berninghaus (1977), where a similar distinction
of risks is introduced and conditional arguments are used the same way. But unfortunately
the Law of Large Numbers is not applicable because in eq.(3) an addition of the indiviual
risks is considered instead of a subdivision, i.e. the factor 1=N is missing. The application
of the Law of Large Numbers is not valid in this case.
But investigations of Nielsen (1985) and Hellwig (1995) justify the use of large number
arguments for the addition of individual risks. The most striking result of these investi-
gations is that even risk-averse agents do not consider the growing variance which arise
by the addition of risks and take only the expectation value of the sum of the risks into
account for their decisions (under mild restrictions on the utility functions of the agents).
The application of these results in regard to the problems in this paper are currently
under way und will be reported in a later version of this paper.
1.5 Comparison to the Approaches of CreditMetrics and Cred-
itRisk+
In this section a short comparison of the model described here and the framework of Cred-
itMetrics (J.P.Morgan (1997)) and CreditRisk+ (CreditSuisse (1997)) is given. A useful
comparison of the structural similarities and dierences of CreditMetrics and CreditRisk+
is given in Gordy (1998).
CreditMetrics is a so-called \rm value" model: A latent variable y
a
describes the value
of the assets of a counterparty a. If y
a
drops under a certain lower barrier d
a
(which might
depend on the rating of the rm), the counterparty defaults. In opposite to this approach
the model decribed in this paper is an \intensity-based" model: With eq.(8) the default
intensities are modeled rather than the rm value. In Gordy (1998) it is shown that the
rm value approach of CreditMetrics can be transformed into an intensity approach, but
the resulting intensity is (with xed market parameters) determinstic, while the intensity
eq.(8) is stochastic due to the noise of the individual credit risks.
But in CreditMetrics the structure of the latent variable y
a
is modeled similar to the
model described here: As Gordy (1998) notes, y
a
writes as a sum of weighted random risk
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factors plus an individual noise term. The interpretation of these terms is similar to the
interpretation of these terms in the model of this paper. The risk factors in CreditMetrics
could be stock indices of dierent industry sectors and the weights of these risk factors
give the composition of the dependency of the considered counterparties of these sectors.
In opposite to this we model a response function to market variables (as the interest rate).
This response function could have a more complicated structure than the linear structure
of a weighted sum. Mostly the risk-factors in CreditMetrics are assumed to be normally
distributed while in this model the response function maps the actual value of the market
variables.
The rm-value approach in CreditMetrics allows for multi-state outcomes (as it is needed
to model rating migration), an intensity approach only allows the events \no default"
or \default". This is the case with the model described here and the approach of Cred-
itRisk+. Both are intensity-based models; multi-state outcomes are not possible.
CreditRisk+ and the model of this paper are similar in that the correlation between
defaults of several counterparties are triggered by some underlying variable. Further the
idea of modelling the intensity function based on underlying risk factors is a common
feature. In CreditRisk+ these risk factors are weighted and summed and then multiplied
with the initial default probability, which might be given by the rating of the considered
counterparty. This is a special kind of a response function. The intensity function in
the model described in this paper is modeled similarly: Instead of the weighted sum the
risk factors are mapped by a more general response function S
a
. This response function
will be gauged so that the initial conguration of the risk factors give the initial default
probability induced by the ocial rating. Beyond that a noise term is added to model
the individual risk compenent, so that a stochastic volatility results. In this model the
noisy term is important for the economic \causality" of market and credit risks. This
noisy term is not incorporated in the model of CreditRisk+, where only the systematic
component is regarded
10
.
There are some further dierences: CreditRisk+ is trimmed to be analytically solvable.
To succeed it is necessary to assume, that the risk factors are Gamma distributed. Further
the exposures and losses have to be multiplicates of a standard unit of exposure or loss.
In CreditRisk+ probability generating functions are considered to give analytical solu-
10
In CreditRisk+ only bonds instead of market-driven instruments are regarded. There is no common
factor which drives the default probability and the exposure (as it is the case in the model described in
this paper). Because of this there is a trivial independence of the exposures and the market variables.
Therefore no modelling of the \causal" relationship between these risks is required.
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tions. These assumptions are not made in the model of this paper, because the analytical
tractability was not the primary objective.
Instead the model described here is trimmed to follow the changes of the market variables
over a given time interval. This is not the case for both CreditRisk+ and CreditMetrics:
Both concentrate on the credit risks in a xed market situation (which might be the best
way if only bonds are regarded), while the model of this paper concentrates on the eects
of the market variables by \eliminating" the individual credit risk components by taking
the expectation value conditioned on the market. But the modelling of the response
function S
a
has not yet be discussed, this will be done in the next chapter.
2 Modelling the Correlation
In chapter 1, a model was introduced which captures eects of the correlation between
market variables and the default intensity. In this chapter, we specialize to the consid-
eration of the interest rate r as a market variable. We assume that there are no other
market variables than r which are important to consider. Certainly in every realistic sit-
uation there will other variables. But here we will try to calibrate the model described in
chapter 1 in the simplest case. An extension to other market variables is straightforward,
if emprical data is available.
We rst review some related economic topics which concern interactions between changes
in the interest rate and default probabilities. There exist some theoretical models where
such an interaction might be included. These are reviewed shortly thereafter. After that
several possibilities to model such a correlation in terms of the response function S
a
(see
eq.(8)) are proposed. Empirical evidence for choosing the parameters of this response
function is discussed at the end of this chapter.
2.1 Economic Surroundings
There are many ways in which a change in the term structure of interest rates could
inuence the nancial standing and with this the default probability of a rm (which
might be one counterparty in the considered portfolio). For example, a rise of the short
rate leads directly to a rise of the costs of short rate debt. Firms which are exposed to
short rate debt are in this situation more likely to get into nancial diculties. In this
case S
a
(r) (see eq.(20), we drop the explicit time dependency in the notation) will be an
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increasing function in r(t) with S
a
(r) ! 1 for r ! 1. For r ! 0 one would expect
S
a
(r) ! c
a
with c
a
> 0 a constant, maybe dependent on a. One could interpret this
constant c
a
as the default intensity of a which is independent of the interest rate.
As an example for a more indirect inuence Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) give empir-
ical evidence, that a positive slope of the yield curve is a predictor of a future increase
of economic activity. This growth in economic activity will strengthen the nancial sit-
uation of some rms which induces a lower default probability. A attening of the yield
curve predicts falling economic activity. On average this reduces the nancial standing of
individual rms.
These examples illustrate the problems of modelling the correlation between the interest
rate and the default probability: First, not only the single rm is inuenced directly, but
also the economic surroundings which will inuence this rm indirectly again. Second,
dierent rms might react dierently to changes in the interest rate. A third problem is
given by the diculties to estimate the default probability which are reviewed later.
2.2 Theoretical Models
There are some theoretical models for pricing the credit risk which allows for a correlation
of the default probability with the interest rate. In opposite to these models we am not
interested primarily in pricing this risk. We give a very short and incomplete survey of
some of these models.
Cooper and Mello (1991) provide a rm value model for pricing the default risk of currency
and interest rate swaps. The process of the value of the rm and the interest rate process
are correlated. The swap rates are related to debt market spreads. They nd that the
swap spread is inversely proportional to the correlation parameter. In the case of risky
bonds Longsta and Schwartz (1995) present another rm value model. They nd that
the credit spread is inuenced by the correlation between the assets of the rm and the
interest rate. This might give an explanation for the dierent yield rates between rms of
dierent industry sectors with the same credit rating. Another theoretic nding is that
the credit spreads are negatively correlated to the level of the interest rate.
In opposite to the rm value models there are \reduced form" models, which regard an
exogenously given hazard rate process instead of a rm value process. Due and Singleton
(1995) value risky bonds in such a model where the hazard rate process might depend on
market variables. The yield spread due to the default risk is given by the intensity of the
hazard rate process times the loss rate, but there might be other determinants of the yield
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spread. The advantage of this approach is that the well-known pricing models without
default risks remain structurally the same, only the interest rate is modied under the
equivalent martingale measure (see section 1.3). In Due and Huang (1996) this model
is extended to value the credit risk of swaps. Again the default characteristics are allowed
to be inuenced by market parameters.
2.3 Response Functions
We will describe the technique and the results of several simulations of a portfolio of in-
terest rate swaps in Barth (1999), where the (known) default intensities S
a
are dependent
of the short rate r. Several dierent response functions S
a
are implemented. Though
the form of this function is somewhat arbitrary (and might depend on the specic coun-
terparty) there is some empirical evidence which might give hints not for choosing the
functional form of S
a
but for choosing the parameters if such a function is proposed. In
the following we will discuss several functions S
a
before listing some empirical results.
To be consistent with the model presented in chapter 2, We have to assume that only
the actual value of r is responsible for the default intensity S
a
, i.e. there should be no
path dependency. Therefore the same S
a
(r(t); t) results regardless if there is a slow rise of
the interest rate r in [0; t] or a sudden increase (followed by a calm period for instance).
S
a
(r(0)) is given by the rating of a at the starting time t = 0.
As the rst possibility we modify the function used by Hull (1989)
11
and obtain
S
e
a
(r(t)) = S
e
a
(r(0)) exp [k
a
(r(t), r(0))] ; (23)
with a counterparty-specic constant k
a
and a starting value S
a
(r(0)) for the known
default intensity. We will call k
a
the response coecient. This function is displayed in
gure 1. Hull uses a time-averaged r instead of r(t) which leads to a path dependency.
Further he introduces an explicit time dependency by multiplying the exponent by t,
which results in a dependency on the strength of the correlation given a xed k on the
chosen time period. This is not the case in our application. We avoid this explicit time
and path dependency. This has the advantage of a multiplicative structure concerning
the intensities. Only the parameter k
a
is left to be chosen.
In the rst order approximation of eq.(23) the interpretation of k
a
is straightforward:
S
e
a
(r(t)) = S
e
a
(r(0)) [1 + k
a
(r(t), r(0))] +O

(r(t), r(0))
2

: (24)
11
To our knowledge the only other investigation with an explicit modelling of such a function.
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Given a change of one percent in the interest rate r(t), r(0) = 0:01, the default intensity
changes by k
a
percent of the initial value S
e
a
(r(0)).
0 5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
8
Figure 1: Correlation functions for k
a
= 16 and r(0) = 0:05 and S
a
(r(0)) = 1: Exponential
eq.(23) (checks), quadratic eq.(25) (stars), linear eq.(26) (squares), and square-root eq.(27)
(triangles). The value of the correlation function S is plotted versus r.
If one regards one realisation of the short rate process, the resulting \paths in default
intensity" S
a
(r(t); t) might be compared with the empirically tracked one year default
probabilities in Fons (1994): They look nearly the same, if one is willing to believe that
the only driving force for a change in the default probability is the interest rate (as it
is assumed in this paper): For companies which are rated investment-grade these paths
are nearly at at a xed level. This situation corresponds to a very small k
a
in eq.(23).
For companies with speculative-grade rating these paths are much more volatile and
correspond therefore to a high k
a
.
Other function S
a
which we use in Barth (1999) are quadratic, linear, and square-root
functions (slightly modied not to be symmetric or hit 0) and displayed in gure 1:
S
q
a
(r(t)) = S
q
a
(r(0))

1 + max
n
0; sgn (k
a
(r(t), r(0))) (k
a
(r(t), r(0)))
2
o
; (25)
S
l
a
(r(t)) = S
l
a
(r(0))max f1; 1 + k
a
(r(t), r(0))g ; (26)
S
r
a
(r(t)) = S
r
a
(r(0))
q
maxf1; 1 + k
a
(r(t), r(0))g: (27)
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In all these functions only the unfavourable market move k
a
(r(t),r(0)) > 0 (as seen from
the counterparty) leads to a larger default probability. In the \good" case k
a
(r(t),r(0)) <
0 the default probability does not change. These functions are introduced to exclude the
possibility that some results of the numerical investigation are driven only by the fast
exponential growth of the correlation function eq.(23).
2.4 Empirical Estimations
The credit rating alone is not a very reliable measure for the default probability. In many
cases the yield spread of corporate bonds issued by the regarded rm will give a better
estimate: Due and Singleton (1995) have shown one example for the variations of the
yield rate of a rm with a constant credit rating. The yield spread of corporate bonds to
treasury yields is determined partly by the expected default probability of the considered
rm. There are also other determinants for the magnitude of the yield spread, for example
liquidity and industry specic eects. Duee (1996b) reports that rms which belong to
dierent industry sectors show dierent yield spreads even when they are rated equally.
It would be necessary to eliminate these other determinants to get an unbiased estimate
of the default probability based on the yield spread.
To our knowledge there are only three empirical investigations of the correlation between
the interest rate and the spread (which we regard as a proxy for the default probability):
Longsta and Schwartz (1995), Duee (1996b), and Dullmann et al. (1998). All three
consider the yield spread between corporate and treasury bonds as a proxy for the default
risk. By accepting this proxy we assume with the existence of S
a
that the term structure
of yield spread is at, because S
a
does not depend on the maturity. This is a good
approximation for longer maturities. Longsta and Schwartz (1995) and Duee (1996b)
consider the US bond market while Dullmann et al. (1998) consider Deutschemark-
denominated bonds.
All three regress the change in the yield spread on the change in the interest rate. Duee
(1996b) and Dullmann et al. (1998) add a proxy for the slope of the term structure.
Furthermore Duee (1996b) and Dullmann et al. (1998) are more careful with eliminating
other determinants of the yield spread (for example tax and liquidity eects) in order to
provide a measure for the default risk alone. There might be a problem with these
regressions if the assumed causality is called in question.
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Wewill refer only to Duee (1996b) and we will describe only the very outlines of this work.
On the basis of monthly data he estimates the coecient b
1
of the following equation:
Y
t
= b
0
+ b
1
r
t
+ : : :+ : (28)
with Y the change in the spread of treasury yields and corporate bonds and r the
monthly change in the three month bill yield (which we see as a proxy for the short rate).
There is one other term in eq.(28) which takes account of the slope of the term structure,
but we am only interested in the absolute level
12
. These regressions are run for dierent
industry sectors. Duee tries to eliminate other determinants of the yield spread than the
market price of default risk. He admits that if there was any other source than the default
risk which inuences the corporate spreads systematically his results will be biased.
The main nding of these regression is a strong negative correlation. This nding is in
agreement with the theoretical and empirical result of Longsta and Schwartz (1995) and
Dullmann et al. (1998). In table 1 we list only the estimated b
1
for \long maturity" bonds
(15-30 years).
Rating Aaa Aa A Baa
b
1
-0.112 -0.155 -0.194 -0.338
Table 1: Results of Duee (1996b) for the regression coecient b
1
, estimated for long maturity
bonds.
These results may be interpreted as follows: A yield increase of the corporate bonds due
to a rise of the short rate by 100 basispoints is b
1
times 100 basispoints less than the
increase of the treasury yield. In other words, the spread Y is diminished by b
1
times
100 bp. This is interpreted as that rising interest rates are related to a growth in economic
activity and therefore a default of the individual rms become more remote. This result
is contrary to the example at the beginning of this chapter. Another observation is that
the correlation tends to rise as the rating falls.
These results refer to an average value in dierent industry sectors (we have reported
only the average statistic over these sectors) and not to single rm values. Do we have
to take individual rm data for an application of the model described in this paper? By
orientating our model at these averaged values we can be sure not to incorporate special
12
This is given with the three month bill rate. The results do not change by taking another variable for
the absolute height, for example the 30 year treasury yield, as Duee (1996a) reports.
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eects of one rm. Further it is more realistic to have reliable information about the
behavior of one sector than about single rms. This is applied in Barth (1999).
We cannot apply these results directly to our work because we take account of the relative
changes, while Duee considers (see eq.(28)) absolute changes of the yield spread. This
can be seen by regarding the exponential correlation function eq.(23) which could be
expanded like
S
a
(r(t+t); t+t) = S
a
(r(t); t) (1 + k
a
r + : : :) (29)
, S
a
(r(t); t) = 1 + k
a
S
a
(r(t); t)r + : : : :
Assuming that the dierence in the yield spread Y only accounts for changes in the
market price of default risk (as discussed in Duee (1996b)), choosing the counterparty
a to represent an \average" rm and identifying Y and S
a
leads to k
a
S
a
(r(t); t) = b
1
.
By choosing a typical value for S
a
it is possible to give a very rough estimate of k
a
. We
use as typical values the default intensities listed in Fons (1994) for each rating class of
Moody's. Table 2 gives the results.
Rating Aaa Aa A Baa
k
a
-153 -170 -99 -68
Table 2: Rough estimates of the response coecient k
a
, based on the investigation of Duee
(1996b).
Even if the absolute responsiveness grows with a lower rating (which is not the case in
all regressions of Duee (1996b) and Dullmann et al. (1998)), this is no longer true with
these relative changes. In the numerical investigations in Barth (1999), we use values
of k
a
for the individual rms in the range of [-32, +32]. The absolute value of these
parameters is in all cases much smaller than the values resulting in the study of Duee.
But we consider not only linear but also nonlinear functions like the exponential function,
where larger changes of r could imply larger contributions. These larger changes will
not be important on the monthly scale, but by iterating eq.(30) for many months a larger
dierence will result. In this sense a careful use of the estimated averaged values is
necessary.
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3 Conclusion
In this paper a model was presented which is suited for calculating the eects of changes in
market variables on the credit risk of a portfolio of market-driven contract subject to credit
risk. This model was compared with the frameworks of CreditMetrics and CreditRisk+.
In contrast to these frameworks the model proposed here concentrates on the treatment
of the market variables while regarding the credit risk. In CreditMetrics and CreditRisk+
the market variables are eliminated and the emphasis is on the treatment of the credit
risks. So the model of this paper takes a complementary approach. In the second part
of the paper the calibration of the correlation between the market and the default risk is
discussed on the basis of recent empirical estimations.
4 Extensions
In Barth (1999) simulation studies based on the model described here are presented. The
main subject of these simulation studies is the determination of the risk-based capital.
The focus lies on taking properly into account the worst cases of the market variables.
Therefore we will discuss several measures for this risk-based capital. The simulation
study will refer to these measures.
The points listed below are ideas for extending the work:
 The application of the Law of Large Numbers is unfortunately not valid. In a later
version of this paper we want to apply arguments of Nielsen (1985) and Hellwig
(1995) to eliminate the individual risks in the case of a large portfolio.
 Instead of considering only one underlying factor for market risk (the interest rate
r), the consideration of many underlying factors (for example currency exchange
rates) might broaden the view of the model.
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